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The failure of territory-oriented ocean resource management regimes
to address successfully the transboundary nature of many offshore geo-
logical systems and ecological assemblages is well-documented.'
Coastal states conservatively managing fisheries within their jurisdiction
can see their efforts undermined and their sacrifices negated by fishers
exploiting the resource beyond their jurisdictional reach . Offshore oil
and gas fields that stretch below and across political boundaries can lead
to overcapitalization by accessors racing to extract the same resources
from both sides. Would-be users of other offshore space or resources
* John A. Duff, J.D., LL.M., Assistant Professor of Environmental, Earth and
Ocean Sciences, University of Massachusetts/Boston, Boston, MA USA 02125-3393.
john.duff@umb.edu.
1. See, e.g., THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS passim (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., 2002);
Lawrence Juda, The European Union and Ocean Use Management: The Marine Strategy and
the Maritime Policy, 38 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 259 (2007).
2. See, e.g., Canadians Win Fish-Boundary Dispute, FRESNO BEE, June 14, 1992, at
Al5, available at 1992 WLNR 1406646.
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seek certainty in dealing with the appropriate (if any) governing authori-
ties administering or authorizing such uses.
This Essay assesses challenges that arise when marine territorial
boundaries do not encompass the appropriate assemblage of resources
and relationships necessary for effective authority and management. It
reviews the manner in which certain offshore resource uses have been
"quasi-territorialized" by the application of other forms of jurisdiction. It
also highlights regime-jurisdiction-private interest-oriented responses to
territory-oriented challenges in the form of assemblages of authority,
interests, space, and time. Given the scalar progression of the links in the
discussion, the assessment moves from international principles to exer-
cises of national sovereignty to domestic administration of space and
resources to private legal interests.
Part I briefly describes a series of multinational regimes that have
existed over time and which have supported national claims of sover-
eignty and jurisdiction. Part II outlines the manner in which nations,
particularly the United States, have worked within international regimes
to support sovereignty claims and (territorial and non-territorial) juris-
dictional claims to a range of offshore resources, including fish,
submerged lands, guano islands and energy. In doing so, the Part notes
that some such claims are based upon proximity, geology, labor, and ex-
ploitability. Part III then assesses those sovereignty and jurisdictional
bases to illustrate the manner in which the public administration of off-
shore resources has evolved over time, often prompted by private
initiatives. Part IV indicates that, in an era of globalization, territory is
no longer as vital as it once was to support economic development. The
vital interest of would-be developers of offshore resources is access,
which requires legally recognized private interests protected by a State's
domestic administration. In turn, this access has been built upon such
nation's jurisdictional claims, which ultimately must comport with prin-
ciples of public international law. This reality suggests an assemblage
oriented approach to jurisdiction, management, and development. Some
examples are provided in support of this assertion.
3. Private interests in ocean space or resources depend upon some recognized gov-
ernmental claim of sovereignty or jurisdiction, which in turn relies upon some international
law of the sea regime accommodating such claims. See infra Part IV.
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I. THE GLOBAL SCALE: CROSSING OCEANS AND CROSSING LINES
The ocean environment has long been considered "the last... fron-
tier on our planet."4 Until the twentieth century the vast majority of
ocean space, while accessible and often used, was free of the effective
strictures of political or economic territorialization. And, most interna-
tionally recognized ocean boundary lines were restricted to relatively
proximate territorial seas a few miles from a State's shores Delineations
regarding jurisdiction and access dating as far back as the eleventh cen-
tury were ordinarily explicit about a narrow claim of right.6
Interestingly, a late fifteenth century demarcation line running verti-
cally through the Atlantic is one of the earliest globe-spanning lines
drawn in the sea that suggests allocated rights of access and use. In
1493, Pope Alexander approved a request by Spain to acknowledge
Spain's claim of right to all "new" lands west of an ocean boundary line,
which in effect suggested Spain should have superior rights over the
Americas! But even that early and seemingly authoritative delineation
demonstrates the fragility and dynamism of such boundary-making. In
1494 Portugal pressed its claim to certain New World areas and the two
States' competing claims were ultimately reconciled via the Treaty of
Torsedillas, which moved the demarcation line further west, providing
Portugal with greater access to certain central-western portions of the
Atlantic and providing it with a foothold in present day Brazil. And
while these fifteenth century papal pronunciations may have influenced
the activities of Spain and Portugal during early forays across the Atlan-
tic, the demarcation line was by no means universally accepted. In the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, other European nations began trav-
ersing the Atlantic in search of resources and footholds for North
American settlement.
4. Federico Mayor, Preface to OCEAN FRONTIERS: EXPLORATIONS BY OCEANOGRA-
PHERS ON FIVE CONTINENTS passim (Elisabeth Mann Borgese ed., 1992).
5. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone art. 24, Apr. 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (indicating that, due to the twelve mile contiguous zone
limit agreed to in the Convention, which was widely applicable through the 1980s, most States
claimed some lesser extent of their territorial sea).
6. Bo Johnson Theutenberg, Mare Clausum et Mare Liberum, 37 ARCTIC 481, 481
(1984) (discussing a 1023 English claim for a portion of the English channel for salvage ac-
cess purposes and twelfth century complementary claims of Norway and Iceland over waters
located between them).
7. POPE ALEXANDER VI, THE BULL INTER CAETERA, translated in I EUROPEAN
TREATIES BEARING ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES TO 1648
71, 75-78 (Frances Gardiner Davenport ed., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1917) (1493); see also
LYLE N. MCALLISTER, SPAIN AND PORTUGAL IN THE NEW WORLD: 1492-1700 74-75 (1984);
PHILIP E. STEINBERG, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE OCEAN 75-76 (2001).
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While Western Europe's efforts to colonize the Americas and the
natural resource wealth therein were primarily terrestrial in nature, the
sea was their medium for doing so. Their claims to these resources were
widely accepted as among the rights afforded to discoverers and con-
querors colonizing the New World. For the first three post-Colombian
centuries, most of the North American inhabitants of European descent,
their centers of commerce and transportation, and their economic liveli-
hoods were tied to coastal communities dotting the east coast. The
colonizing forces employed imperium (claims, rights, and responsibili-
ties of sovereignty) as well as dominium (claims of jurisdiction and
administration) over the New World lands. During that span of time and
well into the twentieth century, however, a State's authority and control
over ocean space were directly related to its capacity to project power
into such space. As States' capacities were often limited, vast expanses
of the world's oceans, including the most economically valuable por-
tions, have been considered res communis, universally accessible in
accordance with the view espoused by Grotius in his 1608 Mare Libe-
8
rum.
At roughly the same time that the major powers of Western Europe
embarked on their global colonization of territory and natural resources,
critics of the nature of government began espousing ideas that would
shape the modern world. In the late seventeenth century, John Locke is-
sued a scathing rebuke of monarchical government and planted the seeds
for modem democracy. 9 While his Two Treatises of Government are
most famous for their novel philosophy of government, their ideas re-
garding property serve as foundational elements of modern English and
American Property Law. Locke addressed a conundrum regarding own-
ership rights over wild animals and common pool resources. Noting that
"there must of necessity be a means to appropriate [common resources]
some way or other before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to
any particular Man,"' he suggested that they could effectively be appro-
priated via the application of human labor.
Locke's notion of appropriation via labor-often referred to as the
"rule of capture"-has a parallel in the labor-oriented principle of colo-
nization, i.e., discovery and settlement. If the New World was deemed
undiscovered and therefore unowned until European landings, history
recounts that immense and often brutal labor was employed to bring
8. See HUGO GROTIus, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS passim (Ralph Van Deman Ma-
goffin trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (1608).
9. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
10. Id. at 328 para. 26 (emphasis in original).
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North American land and resources under the control and authority of
the a variety of laborer-conquerors.
Until the twentieth century, control of the seas was important not so
much for the resources therein, but as a means of colonizing overseas
lands. While the rule of capture applied to extraction of fish from the
seas, there was no universally accepted regime regarding sovereign
rights of access to the oceans. As ship-building, navigational skills and
instruments developed over time, the capacity to reach and exploit off-
shore resources increased. As a result access became a key to ocean
riches.
Two competing seventeenth century ideas-Mare Liberum, or the
notion that the seas ought to be freely accessible and incapable of being
exclusively enclosed by any nation, and Mare Clausum, or the idea that
the sea was capable of enclosure--expressed the tension between efforts
to preserve ocean freedom and actions seeking to territorialize effec-
tively portions of the seas." That tension continued into the twentieth
century, when U.N.-facilitated efforts to negotiate and codify interna-
tional law of the sea principles bore fruit in the form of a series of four
treaties resulting from the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS I). While those four treaties dealt with a range of
law of the sea principles"'" their lack of specificity and their failure to
anticipate the influence that technological developments would have on
ocean resource development rendered them relatively deficient in a matter
of years. Although a Second U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea failed
to bring about any changes, a Third Conference led to a decade-long mul-
tilateral negotiation that resulted in a comprehensive Convention in 1982.'"
None of the conference or negotiations leading to those treaties originated
from a blank slate; rather they built upon a collection of ideas, customs,
claims, and principles that had been developing for centuries. And while
the actors seeking to claim or protect the oceans often did so from a na-
tional perspective they understood that those national perspectives had
to exist within public international law regimes. While particular
11. See e.g., M6nica Brito Vieira, Mare Liberum vs. Mare Clausum: Grotius, Freitas,
and Selden's Debate on Dominion over the Seas, 64 J. HIST. IDEAS 361 (2003).
12. Convention on the High Seas art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82
(relating to high seas "freedoms); Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
supra note 5 (territorial sea and contiguous zone authority); Convention on the Continental
Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf] (continental shelf interests); Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (living
marine resource management fights and responsibilities).
13. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc A/CONF.62/122 (Oct. 7, 1982) reprinted in 21 I.L.M.
1261 (1982) [hereinafter United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea].
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U.S.-oriented offshore boundary issues are highlighted in Part II, the role
of technology and technology's influence in supporting U.S. claims that
shaped international law merit mention here.
With the exception of narrow bands of sea stretching no more than
three miles from a nation's shores, the earth's marine areas historically
were very much frontier areas hostile to human use and intrusion; al-
though valuable, the nature of the ocean and the inherent risks of
venturing into it, coupled with uncertainty in the laws governing State
claims to offshore resources, rendered them largely inaccessible. While
technological developments in late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury indicated the increasing capacity of humans to extract a greater and
wider variety of economic value from offshore areas, two events in the
1940s signaled some of the great changes to come.
In the opening pages of his book, The Silent World, Jacques Cous-
teau employs a legal term ordinarily used in discussions of territory,
property, and ownership. In relating his first experience using the aqua-
lung that he conceived with Emile Gagnan,'4 he says, "I looked into the
sea with the same sense of trespass that I have felt on every dive."'5 But
that 1943 dive was different for Cousteau since, for the first time, he was
untethered from the cumbersome breathing hoses of the past and was
able to break free of one earthly medium to enter another. This break-
through enabling free (albeit limited) access to expanses of the
subsurface sea came forty years after the Wright Brothers similarly
broke free from earth to explore the expanses of the sky. Why did Cous-
teau characterize his ventures into the sea as "trespass?" His choice of
words suggests that he considered the ocean realm to be something other
than unoccupied. For years, using other means of access, Cousteau had
been exploring the life and ecological relationships that occupy the sea.
His statement suggests a sense of intrusion into others' space. But his-
tory suggests that his sense of exploration overcame his sense of
transgression into other-space.
He may have been employing the term to highlight the romantic no-
tion of the ocean as an other-space incapable of human claim; but,
shortly after Cousteau's first aqualung dive, the inclination of humans to
claim greater expanses of the sea began in earnest. In 1945, U.S. Presi-
dent Harry Truman issued a proclamation designed to put to rest the
notion that venturing offshore would amount to trespass. The President's
14. The aqualung is the name applied to the early versions of a self contained underwa-
ter breathing apparatus (SCUBA), which includes an air cylinder and a demand regulator.
Cousteau and Emile Gagnan (an industrial engineer) designed and successfully employed the
device in 1943. See JACQUES-YVES COUSTEAU, THE COUSTEAU ALMANAC 470 (1981).
15. J. Y. COUSTEAU AND FRtD RIC DUMAS, THE SILENT WORLD 5 (Harper & Row
1953) (1950) (emphasis added).
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proclamation claimed exclusive jurisdiction over the resources on and
below the continental shelf of the United States.
6
For purposes of this discussion there are three particularly notewor-
thy elements of the proclamation. First, President Truman noted at the
outset that the United States' new ability to extract offshore petroleum
was a primary impetus for the claim. Second, Truman claimed that the
continental shelf areas were extensions of the landmass of the United
States and "appurtenant" to it. Third, the terms used in and conspicu-
ously omitted from the proclamation merit mention. The Proclamation
never employed the terms "territory" or "sovereignty" but rather claimed
"jurisdiction and control" And even those claims were qualified by the
practical factor of actual accessibility or exploitability.
President Truman's claim of U.S. authority over vast, although at the
time undetermined, expanses of offshore space was a significant moment
in the development of public international law. There existed no interna-
tional law of the sea regime to support the claim. And while some critics
may have suggested initially that President Truman's claim of exclusive
authority stemmed from the mare clausum school of thought, his choice
of words and explicit acknowledgment that "[tihe character as high seas
of the waters above the continental shelf and the right to their free and
unimpeded navigation are in no way thus affected" signals his respect to
mare liberum principles. Estimates based on technological capacity sug-
gested that the boundary of exploitability, and therefore the extent of
jurisdictional claims, extended to, but perhaps not further than, the 100
fathom isobath.'7 Within a few years of the Truman Proclamation, a
number of other coastal States followed suit. ' 8
In 1950, one legal scholar suggested that so many States had adopted
such claims that a customary international law principle may have
emerged.' 9 The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf served as a
codifying mechanism for these types of claims. In fact both the 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf and the 1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea's provisions regarding the continental shelf employ a
term Truman refrained from using, i.e., "sovereignty" albeit it in a man-
ner that limits such sovereignty to exploration and exploitation of natural
16. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303, para. 6 (Oct. 2, 1945) [hereinafter
Truman Proclamation] ("[Tlhe United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and
sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the
United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.").
17. See Press Release, White House (Sept. 30, 1945), as reprinted in Continental Shelf,
4 Whiteman DIGEST § 2, at 762.
18. See ANN L. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 117-20
(1981).
19. H. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 1950 BR. Y.B. INT'L L. 376,
393-98.
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resources. 0 The 1958 Convention did not employ the term territory, nor
did it establish a well-defined boundary. In fact, its attempts to employ
an optional functional delineation principle-"to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources"-
rather than an exclusive geographical limit (for example, a 200 metre
isobath) muddied rather than clarified efforts to determine its practical
meaning.2'
The "exploitability principle" served to support authoritative and ju-
risdictional claims but it did so in a way much different than traditional
claims of territory. Territorial claims were historically made by projec-
tion of force and occupation into a geographic area; claims based on
exploitability do not lend themselves to facile boundary delineation.
How does one map the functional boundary of exploitability? The 1982
Convention sought to resolve these "rubber boundary"2 questions by
creating a geo-legal continental shelf regime that would afford coastal
States claims of 200 nautical miles even where the geography did not
support such claims, and even greater claims where the geography did. 2
Having outlined certain relevant aspects of the development of inter-
national law of the sea principles, in the next Part I explore the manner
in which a given nation operates within that international context, a topic
well illustrated by the history of the United States from its sovereign ori-
gin.
II. THE UNITED STATES: INDEPENDENT OF A KING,
DEPENDENT ON THE OCEAN
A basic relationship that serves as a helpful foundation for research
related to ocean and coastal law can be summed up like this: the use and
development of offshore resources affects and is affected by legal and
public policy developments. Those two factors (use/development and
law/policy) in turn affect and are affected by the offshore resources
themselves and the ecosystems within which they exist.
The generic references to resource development, legal development,
and ecology are not only short-hand in terms of their generality but are
purposely non-specific to indicate that neither the state of law, the state
of natural resource development, nor the state of the ecosystem is static,
20. Both the Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 12, art. 2. and the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 13, art. 77(1), state "[t]he coastal State
exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and ex-
ploiting its natural resources."
21. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 12, art. 1.
22. WILLIAM T. BURKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 2-13 (1998).
23. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 13, art. 76.
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but rather each is dynamic. That dynamism becomes readily apparent
when the status of one component or the relationship between two or
more of them is disrupted. A familiar example of such a disruption is
provided by our own nation at its origin.
In scribing the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson out-
lined a disruption-a dissolution of the political bonds between the
American Colonies and their overseas sovereign-and in so doing
brought to an end a century and a half colonization of tremendous wealth
in the form of territory and natural resources. Interestingly, he invoked
the "laws of nature" when outlining the founders' rationale for claiming
independence from an English king. And, more importantly for this dis-
cussion, he implied a dependence on onshore and offshore resources
when he claimed the seas and coasts for the people of this nascent na-
14tion-not as spatially defining boundaries but as important resources.
In so doing he may be one of the earliest revolutionaries to stake a claim
for a new nation, in part, by virtue of resources and use as much as by
territory and space.
Having cited Jefferson, it is merited to revisit an individual whose
writings Jefferson relied upon, not only in his thinking but in his drafting
of the Declaration-John Locke. Jefferson appropriated important ideas
and indeed passages of Locke's writings when he stated the rationale for
revolution against a monarch, whose "long train of abuses," he argued,
justified such action.25 In claiming that "[King George] has plundered
our seas [and] has ravaged our coasts" Jefferson reaches beyond Locke's
notion of government or property. While Locke espoused a labor theory
of property appropriation, Jefferson applied a proximity and use princi-
ple when he suggested that the people of an independent United States
ought to govern their own territory including "[their] seas."
In any discussion of territory, authority and rights related to offshore
resources it is important to establish the relationship between public law-
oriented notions of notions of territory and private law notions of prop-
erty. Other contributors to this symposium volume have highlighted the
traditional boundary-territory relationships and may even have suggested
that there can be territory without boundaries. I suggest that, from the
very moment that the United States came into being, U.S. offshore re-
source governance practices have relied upon notions of boundaries that
are moving away from a territorial basis and toward a more jurisdictional
basis. In doing so, I suggest that the unique and dynamic nature of many
24. "He has plundered our seas, he has ravaged our Coasts ... he has destroyed the
lives of our people." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 26 (U.S. 1776), available at
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration-transcript.html.
25. See id.; LOCKE, supra note 9, at 454-77.
Michigan Journal of International Law
offshore resources has prompted that movement and, in doing so, has
effectively eroded need for traditional territorial lines and has fostered
the application of non-territorial bases for jurisdiction. And, since the
growth and development of the United States has depended upon off-
shore resources, the United States has continually engaged in efforts to
claim, administer, and develop those resources via evolved notions of
territorial and non-territorial jurisdiction, leading to practical new man-
agement assemblages.
A. Shifting Governance and Management from Territory to Other Bases
When Jefferson made his claim of "our seas" in 1776, he did so not
based on any internationally accepted principles of territorial sovereignty
over ocean space. Indeed, at the time there was little if any standardized
agreement regarding a coastal State's sovereignty over or even right of
exclusion from waters extending beyond the internal waters, ports, and
immediate nearshore offshore space. In fact, any notion that a band of
waters adjacent to a coastal State might be governable was limited to the
practical reach of a cannonball. An early U.S. Supreme Court decision
suggesting that a coastal State's authority was "not confined to [its] har-
bors or the range of its batteries[]" was limited in nature and scope
because it suggested that a nation might exert its authority offshore in
very limited circumstances, i.e., to interdict ships bound for illicit trade
in the coastal State's ports.26
In his 1862 annual message to Congress, President Abraham Lincoln
noted that "a nation may be said to consist of its territory, its people and
its laws. 27 Some international treaties and international law treatises ex-
pand upon this definition, suggesting that a State, to be recognized as
such, must exhibit four key components: a defined territory, a permanent
population, a government, and a capacity to conduct international rela-
tions." In the United States, a glance at the American Law Institute's
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations suggests that the territory
component ought to be somewhat discernable but that it may fall short of
being completely definable. A reading of the Restatement's comments
and Reporters' Notes related to the requisite aspects of statehood29 pro-
26. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 187 (1804).
27. Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862) reprinted in ABRA-
HAM LINCOLN-SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865 393, 403 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1989).
28. See Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097,
165 L.N.T.S. 19 (Montevideo Convention).
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREjGrN RELATIONS LAW § 201 (1987). ("State defined.
Under international law, a [S]tate is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent
population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity
to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.").
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vides one possible answer to the question implicit in the Symposium's
title-yes, there is territory without boundaries.
Section 201's Comment b., regarding the defined territory aspect of a
State, notes that "[a]n entity may satisfy the territorial requirement for
statehood even if its boundaries have not been finally settled, if one or
more of its boundaries are disputed, or if some of its territory is claimed
by another [S]tate." 30 Nonetheless, a discernible offshore landmass with
identifiable boundaries may still provoke another question: whose terri-
tory is it?
1. Las Palmas
An early twentieth century conflict illustrates the isolating effect that
the ocean has on a remote island which could in fact lead to the erosion
of even the strongest claim of jurisdiction, i.e., territorial sovereignty. In
the case of las Plamas, isolation resulted in de facto abandonment ulti-
mately capitalized upon by another nation. In the Island of Palmas
dispute between the United States and the Netherlands,3' an arbitrator
ruled that the Netherlands had sovereignty over an isolated island situ-
ated roughly midway between two island groups governed by the
contesting parties. In doing so, he examined the respective claims of ac-
quisition of title to the island. use.32 The key factor, he determined, was
not whether one nation had succeeded to valid title and sovereignty (the
United States claimed to be a successor-in-interest to Spain, which had
discovered the island) but whether that claim of sovereignty endured in
light of a lack of occupation, protection, or use by the United States.
During a decades-long span of disinterest on the part of the United
States, the Netherlands and its nationals had increasingly, and somewhat
continuously, used and claimed the island as their own. Unlike the Unit-
ed States, the Netherlands could not point to a specific point in time at
which its sovereignty attached. Nonetheless, in his decision, Arbitrator
Huber noted that "[i]t is quite natural that sovereignty may be the out-
come of a slow evolution, of a progressive intensification of State
control.' 3  An interesting manifestation of occupancy and administration
on the part of the Netherlands, noted the arbitrator, was the taxation of
30. Id. § 201 cmt. b ("Defined territory. An entity may satisfy the territorial require-
ment for statehood even if its boundaries have not been finally settled, if one or more of its
boundaries are disputed, or if some of its territory is claimed by another state." (emphasis in
original)).
31. Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 829 (Penn. Ct. Arb.
1928).
32. Id. at 867 ("[The United States has] not established the fact that sovereignty so
acquired was effectively displayed at any time.").
33. Id. at 867.
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the people of las Palmas. His statement suggests that one State's claim
of sovereignty may accrete by occupation and administration, and in so
doing erode another State's prior claim of sovereignty.
2. Guano islands
Although natural resources are often associated with the territory in
which they are situated (and the sovereignty that applies therein), marine
resource development, to read between and employ Lincoln's lines, has
often been affected less by territorial considerations than by the initiative
of people and the actions of lawmakers. A handful of nineteenth century
examples serve as illustrations.
No one will ever confuse bat and bird excrement (guano) with terri-
tory. Nonetheless, the United States Congress saw guano as an important
enough resource to fashion a law supporting entrepreneurial efforts to
discover, claim, and exploit the resource in a fashion parallel, but not
identical, to traditional means of discovery, claim, and exploitation of
territory. When Congress passed the Guano Act of 1 8563" they stated:
Whenever any citizen of the United States discovers a deposit of
guano on any island, rock, or key, not within the lawful jurisdic-
tion of any other government, and not occupied by the citizens
of any other government, and takes peaceable possession the-
reof, and occupies the same, such island, rock, or key may, at the
discretion of the President, be considered as appertaining to the
United States.36
That first Section of the law is an acknowledgment of the interna-
tionally acceptable principle of discoverability and claim of territory
deemed terra nullius. As a result the application of the Guano Act has
provided territory-like interests to the United States, riches in the form of
the value of the private property that inures to the discover,37 and great
benefit to the American public in the form of a low cost agricultural pro-
34. Id. at 865 ("The most important fact is however the existence of documentary evi-
dence as to the taxation of the people of Miangas by the Dutch authorities.").
35. An Act to Authorize Protection to be Given to Citizens of the United States Who
May Discover Deposits of Guano, 11 Stat. 119 (1856) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1411-1419
(2000)) [hereinafter Guano Act]. For more expansive historical contexts of the Guano Act see,
e.g., Jimmy M. SKAGGS, THE GREAT GUANO RUSH: ENTREPRENEURS AND AMERICAN OVER-
SEAS EXPANSION (1994); Christina Duffy Burnett, The Edges of Empire and the Limits of
Sovereignty: American Guano Islands, 57 AM. Q. 779 (2005).
36. 48 U.S.C. § 1411 (2000).
37. 48 U.S.C. § 1414 (2000) ("The discoverer ... may be allowed, at the pleasure of
Congress, the exclusive right of occupying such island, rocks, or keys, for the purpose of ob-
taining guano, and of selling and delivering the same... ").
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duction input." In the late nineteenth century the question regarding one
guano island's jurisdictional status made its way to the U.S. Supreme
Court. In Jones v. United States39 , the Court held that the Guano Act es-
tablished sufficient jurisdiction over islands claimed in accordance with
the Act so as to support criminal proceedings against defendants who
killed managers of a guano-collecting enterprise. While the Court
reached its ruling by way of the Guano Act, it suggested that the applica-
tion of the Act created U.S. territory. A careful reading of the Act by at
least one legal scholar, however, suggests that the Court's use of the term
"territory" was erroneous.
In her thoughtful work examining the elements of sovereignty, terri-
tory, boundaries, and jurisdiction, Christina Duffy Burnett examines the
territory issue. She suggests that, while the Guano Act conferred U.S.
jurisdiction over such islands, it never held itself forth as a mechanism
for claiming territory in the traditional temporal-i.e., perpetual-sense,
since the Act itself never uses the term "territory." More importantly, the
claim of use and jurisdiction under the Act is temporary in nature: such
claims are suggested as valid only as long as the islands continue to pro-
vide guano.' Given that the circumstances supporting a claim of
discovery giving rise to authority under the Guano Act also seem capable
of supporting a claim of discovery giving rise to sovereignty, why would
the United States choose the former and not the lesser claim? Professor
Burnett suggests that the United States was only interested in the island
as a guano source and that, once that utility ceased, the island was no
longer of sufficient value for the United States to desire sovereign (seem-
ingly perpetual) rights over the island, since it would be required to
assume corollary responsibilities of occupation and protection.
4'
While guano may be the byproduct of a fugacious resource (bats and
birds), the guano itself is less than fleeting once it lands. But some tran-
sient offshore resources have served as the vehicle for claims of property
rights absent territory, chiefly fish and whales. And here is where
Locke's observations have been employed and modified.
38. 48 U.S.C. § 1415 (2000) ("No guano shall be taken from any island, rock, or key
mentioned in section 1411 of this title, except for the use of the citizens of the United States or
of persons resident therein.").
39. Jones v. U.S., 137 U.S. 202, 211 (1890) ("[Such crimes] shall be held and deemed
to have been done or committed on the high seas, on board a merchant ship or vessel belong-
ing to the United States, and be punished according to the laws of the United States relating to
such ships or vessels and offenses on the high seas; which laws, for the purposes aforesaid, are
hereby extended to and over such islands, rocks or keys." (quoting Guano Act, supra note 35,
§ 3).
40. 48 U.S.C. § 1419 ("Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed as obliging
the United States to retain possession of the islands, rocks, or keys, after the guano shall have
been removed from the same."); Burnett, supra note 35, at 785-86.
41. See Burnett, supra note 35, at 785.
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B. The Rule of Capture and Its Adaptation
Over time, the rule of capture most famously articulated by Locke
has been adapted to define ownership in a number of particular circum-
stances. In the United States, a few illustrations of such adaptations can
be seen in case law and federal statutes.
1. Fish and Whales and Birds
Interestingly, long before Locke articulated his rule of capture prin-
ciple, fishermen had been crossing oceans and employing the notion to a
wide range of fishery resources. Mark Kurlanksy's book Cod, appropri-
ately subtitled "a biography of the fish that changed the world," recounts
the role that one species of fish (Gadus morhua) played in enticing Vi-
kings and Europeans to risk their lives and cross the tempestuous North
Atlantic to the shores of Greenland and North America.42 John McPhee
characterizes another species, the American Shad (Alosa sapidissima), as
so important to eighteenth century Americans as to merit the appellation
"The Founding Fish," in a book of the same title.43 As long as fish have
been plentiful they have, for the most part, confounded the concepts of
territory by either existing wholly outside national claims of space or
ignoring the boundaries by swimming in and out of such space. Histori-
cally, the commonly applied rule was that any such resources existing
outside of a State's territorial boundaries belonged to no one (i.e., no title
to them existed) until they were reduced to possession (i.e., captured) by
anyone capable of doing so. Furthermore, the rule of capture as applied
to fish operated even within a State's territorial space, albeit the range of
potential capturers was limited to those with some right of access to the
space/territory.
In the late nineteenth century, the rule of capture was examined, re-
fined, and applied by a federal court, in a decision regarding ownership
interest in a whale that washed up on a Cape Cod beach. In Ghen v.
Rich," the court was faced with a situation in which a whale struck and
killed by a lance from Ghen's ship immediately sank and ultimately
washed up on a nearby shore three days later. While Ghen had not com-
pletely reduced the whale to possession (i.e., had not perfected the
capture), Cape Cod custom dictated that a whale washed up on shore and
identifiably linked to the party that caused its demise would be deemed
to be owned by that party, subject only to a salvage fee or reward due to
42. MARK KURLANSKY, COD: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FISH THAT CHANGED THE WORLD
(1997).
43. JOHN MCPHEE, THE FOUNDING FISH (2002).
44. Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881).
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the party who ultimately stumbled upon the whale.4 The case illustrates
the adaptation of the "rule of capture" to suit the practical needs of in-
dustry.
The fact that fugacious resources may occupy one, then another,
then no State's territory gives rise to important questions: first, what
rights may a government apply to such resources and, more importantly,
which level of government properly makes the decision? In Missouri v.
Holland, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that while a state might apply its
laws and regulations to wildlife resources, that legal authority could be• 46
pre-empted via federal statute or international treaty obligation. More
importantly for purposes of this discussion, the Court dismissed the
state's contention that it held title to migratory birds based on their pres-
ence within the state's territory, holding that while the state had certain
jurisdiction over such birds while they visited the state, that jurisdiction
was not based on title. The Court asserted,
The State as we have intimated founds its claim of exclusive au-
thority upon an assertion of title to migratory birds, an assertion
that is embodied in statute. No doubt it is true that as between a
State and its inhabitants the State may regulate the killing and
sale of such birds, but it does not follow that its authority is ex-
clusive of paramount powers. To put the claim of the State upon
title is to lean upon a slender reed. Wild birds are not in the pos-
session of anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership.
The whole foundation of the State's rights is the presence within
their jurisdiction of birds that yesterday had not arrived, tomor-
row may be in another State and in a week a thousand miles
47away.
2. Problems with Offshore Boundary Lines and a
Few Attempts to Solve Them
As stated above, territory is vital to claims of statehood and the land
that constitutes territory is an enormously valuable resource that supports
the people and economies of States. Territory in the traditional land
sense lends itself to delineation by discernable boundary lines. From the
fifteenth through the twentieth centuries, the ocean served as the means
for the colonization of vast expanses of land and, accordingly, territorial
expansion. But in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries nations began
looking to the sea not as an avenue to access valuable terrestrial
45. Id. at 162. "The finder usually receives a small salvage for his services." Id. at 160.
46. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 416 (1920).
47. Id. at 434.
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resources but as a source of valuable resources unto itself. In doing so,
they recognized that the key to developing these new resources lay not in
traditional notions of land and territory but in principles of access and
jurisdiction. Boundaries may be helpful in establishing ownership and
sovereignty, but they are not comprehensive solutions. They are often
incapable of containing the interests and values of States and economic
endeavors: people move, fish swim, birds fly, water flows, and oil and
gas seep and migrate.
3. Offshore Oil and Gas
Fish and whales are not the only migrating offshore resources upon
which the United States has come to depend. In 2008, the United States
domestically produced approximately one-third of the oil and roughly
eighty percent of the natural gas it used. Much of these resources was
extracted from offshore space, chiefly from the Gulf of Mexico. Two
territory-authority issues worthy of note in this discussion are 1) the
boundary line within the Gulf between the United States and Mexico in
the Gulf; and, 2) the boundary lines within U.S. waters between state
and federal submerged lands. Together they illustrate the desire for
boundary lines in the sea and the management-related challenges that
remain even when boundaries are clearly delineated.
III. THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO IN THE GULF OF MEXICO
As noted above, the United States played a seminal role in the de-
velopment of the modem international law regime governing continental
shelf claims. President Truman's proclamation included a prediction that
advances in technology inevitably would lead to the increasing ability to
extract offshore petroleum and mineral resources.4 ' The claim also an-
ticipated a day when U.S. continental shelf claims might be limited by
competing claims of other States.4 9 By the 1970s the respective claims of
the United States and Mexico regarding authority over expanses of the
Gulf of Mexico prompted the negotiation of a bilateral treaty that would
establish a maritime boundary line between the two nations in the Gulf.0
The treaty was signed by both nations in 1978. Mexico ratified the treaty
48. See Truman Proclamation, supra note 16, at 12,303 ("[W]ith modem technological
progress [extraction of petroleum and mineral resources located beneath the continental shelf]
is already practicable or will become so... ").
49. Id. ("In cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of another State, or
is shared with an adjacent State, the boundary shall be determined by the United States and
the State concerned in accordance with equitable principles.").
50. See Treaty on Maritime Boundaries Between the United Mexican States and the
United States of America, U.S.-Mex., May 4, 1978, S. EXEC. Doc. No. F, 96-1 (1978).
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promptly, but the United States refrained from ratifying it until circum-
stances evolved to the point where doing so became economically
important, i.e., when oil and gas developers were able to foresee that the
far-offshore areas near the treaty boundary line would become economi-
cally viable."1 When that happened, business interests testified before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the need for ratification
and the Senate agreed. The United States ratified the treaty on October
23, 1997.
That agreement in turn opened the door for a second treaty with
Mexico regarding an area of the Gulf that would not be encompassed by
either State's 200 mile claims, but which was effectively wedged be-
tween them-the "Western gap." Negotiations to delineate that area
moved quickly and culminated in a treaty that Mexico and the United
States signed and ratified in 2000 and which entered into force on Janu-
ary 17, 2001.52 As a result, today we have a defined line, a defined gap, a
defined line within the gap, and defined buffer zones on either side of
that line within the gap within the Gulf. But, while the lines might lend
comfort to those who appreciate the certainty of maps, one commentator
suggests that the complex geology of a large expanse of the Gulf of
Mexico and the migratory nature of oil and gas, warrants a more com-
prehensive, cooperative development agreement between the two
States.53
A. The United States and its Several States in the Gulf of Mexico
Although U.S. developers are pushing deeper into U.S. federal wa-
ters and moving closer to the boundary lines with Mexico, they have not
lost sight of the fact that valuable oil and gas reserves remain in nearer
shore waters. A visit to coastal areas of Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas
will bring oil rigs into view. These states benefit from the largesse pro-
vided by Congress via the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, which
transferred economic and jurisdictional interests related to nearshore
submerged lands to the states.4 In most cases states acquired an ocean
51. John A. Duff, U.S. Ratifies Maritime Boundary Treaty with Mexico, 17:4 WATER
LoG 1 (1997).
52. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the United Mexican States on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Western
Gulf of Mexico Beyond 200 Nautical Miles, U.S.-Mex., June 9, 2000, S. TREATY Doc. No.
106-39 [hereinafter Western Gap Agreement]; see also 146 CONG. REC. 23,077 (2000) (Sen-
ate advice and consent statement).
53. For a thoughtful article on this issue, see Richard J. McLaughlin, Hydrocarbon
Development in the Ultra-Deepwater Boundary Region of the Gulf of Mexico: Time to Reex-
amine a Comprehensive U.S.-Mexico Cooperative Agreement, 39 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1
(2008).
54. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (2000).
Michigan Journal of International Law
expanse extending three nautical miles from shore. Texas and Florida
acquired three marine leagues or approximately nine nautical miles due
to their unique circumstances leading to their admission to the Union."
As a result, offshore wells tapping into oil and gas fields may be situated
in state or federal waters, depending on where the oil and gas are.
When the oil and gas fields are situated such that they straddle the
state-federal boundary, either the state or the federal government may
lease out the lands above the resources to accommodate drilling. How-
ever, a drill situated at one point above the resource, for example on the
federal side, is capable of depleting a substantial portion of the strad-
dling resource. Employment of the rule of capture supports the driller's
claim to the resource, even at the seemingly inequitable expense of those
on the non-drilling side (or the state). Thus a state facing such a situation
would be economically motivated to lease out quickly areas in its juris-
diction, so as to ensure that the value of the resources would be exploited
before they were drained away to the other side. The scenario could es-
calate and quickly lead to overcapitalization, an inefficient and likely
unsightly result. Boundaries do not solve the problem in such a case,
they merely illustrate the problem. The solution, as becomes clear when
boundaries fail to address a problem, is an assemblage-oriented agree-
ment or a cooperative arrangement.
IV. MOVING FROM TERRITORY TO ASSEMBLAGES
as-sem-blage n. L.a. The act of assembling. b. The state of being
assembled. 2. A collection of people or things. 3. A fitting to-
gether of parts, as of a machine.56
The concept of assemblages serves as an organizing principle for
this section and the selection of that term stems from a general as well as
a specific application of its use. A rather general definition of the term
found in the dictionary is the concept that Saskia Sassen employs in her
book entitled Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global As-
57semblages . In Dr. Sassen's work, the assemblage concept focuses on
how territory, authority, and rights have been aggregated to form the
foundations of nation-states during the Late Middle Ages and how they
55. Id. § 1312; see also United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960) (holding that
Texas' and Florida's claims of three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico were valid in light
of the conditions under which they entered the Union).
56. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 79 (William
Morris ed., American Heritage Publishing Co. 1973) (1969).
57. SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL
ASSEMBLAGES (2006).
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are often assembled in our present era to serve as the foundation for
global systems supported and enabled by nation-states "that require
neither territoriality nor exclusivity."'
But the term is also used in a narrower sense by ecologists and natu-
ral resource managers to describe some group of biological organisms
and/or physical habitat structures that occupy the same space and time
such that they ought to be considered and managed with an understand-
ing of those relationships and simultaneities 9 And an interesting overlap
between those two uses of the term can be seen in principles of law and
the evolution of claims of title and jurisdiction over offshore resources
that reside in whole or in part beyond areas ordinarily considered state
territory. As a parallel to that contention, boundary-spanning stewardship
of marine ecosystem assemblages is likely to be similarly supported and
enabled by assembling various governing units, which individually
would be incapable of effective management at the appropriate scale.
Professor McDorman's articles and books over the years, along with
his contribution to this Symposium, have highlighted assemblages of
state and private interests that have led to cooperative fishing arrange-
ments, particularly between the United States and Canada. In addition to
such U.S.-Canada cooperative (or as I have labeled them "assemblage-
oriented") efforts, a U.S. domestic fishery assemblage arrangement
exists in the form of the delegation of federal authority to the state of
Massachusetts over fishing in federal waters located in Nantucket
Sound, ° not due to any lack of boundary definition, but because when
the boundary is viewed and the resource assemblage within it consid-
ered, delegation of authority to the state makes sense.
I would add that some of the other offshore resources referred to
above in this contribution highlight a range of other assemblages tailored
to address the national governance and private utilization desires of state
and commercial actors. The Guano Act, while arguably obsolete, is an
early example where territory and sovereignty were not sought. As a re-
sult, the statute was designed to exert a claim of jurisdiction temporary
58. Id. at 19-21.
59. The ecological use of the term can be found in a variety of regulations and is ex-
plicitly used by Congress in the "Findings" section of the National Marine Sanctuaries Act.
See 16 U.S.C. § 143 l(a)(4) (2000) ("[Tihe National Marine Sanctuary System will ... main-
tain for future generations the habitat, and ecological services, of the natural assemblage of
living resources that inhabit these areas.") (emphasis added).
60. 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a)(2) (2006) ("For the purposes of this chapter, except as pro-
vided in subsection (b) of this section, the jurisdiction and authority of a State shall extend ...
with respect to the body of water commonly known as Nantucket Sound, to the pocket of
water west of the seventieth meridian west of Greenwich.").
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in nature and limited in scope.6' The U.S.-Mexico treaties regarding ma-
ritime boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico acknowledge and set the stage
for a solution to the shortcomings of such boundaries when resources
straddle boundary lines. According to President William Clinton's
transmittal letter accompanying the "Western Gap" agreement, "It]he
Treaty also establishes procedures for addressing the possibility of oil
and gas reservoirs that extend across the continental shelf boundary. 62
And even when oil and gas resources exist exclusively within U.S.
jurisdiction, they may below or near federal-state boundaries, which has
prompted the U.S. federal government to fashion a number of compensa-
tion arrangements to reduce or eliminate threats of overcapitalization.
Through these agreements, states receive royalty payments from energy
production operations that result from oil and gas fields that straddle the
federal-state boundary or are relatively proximate to the state boundary.63
Such assemblage-oriented arrangements acknowledge the transboundary
nature of the resource, anticipate the threat of multiple authorities pro-
viding access in an uncoordinated manner, and fashion management
mechanisms to reduce or eliminate such threats.
CONCLUSION
Until the late twentieth century the vast expanse of the planet's
ocean space was unregulated, unoccupied by human endeavor, and de-
cidedly un-territorial in nature. As noted above, the fact that certain
valuable offshore resources exist beyond the territorial boundaries of a
State may frustrate the advantageous use or responsible management of
those resources. Nonetheless the history of laws applicable to these types
of extra-territorial, unowned, or unused resources indicates that they in-
deed can be claimed via projected authority, exploited via diligent labor,
and in certain circumstances effectively colonized, i.e., occupied and
61. 48 U.S.C. § 1417 (2000) (treating guano islnads as high seas areas or U.S. vessels
on high seas rather than as territory of the U.S. for criminal jurisdiction purposes); 48 U.S.C.
§ 1419 (2000) ("[The] United States [is not obliged] to retain possession of the islands.").
Additional challenges arise when the employment of a statute, ostensibly temporary in terms
of its jurisdictional claim, becomes seemingly permanent, as in the case of Navassa Island,
which is still claimed by the United States but for very different purposes. See CIA-World
Factbook-Haiti, https://www.cia.govlibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/HA.html
(last visited June 8, 2009) (acknowledging the dispute over Navassa); see also Fabio Spadi,
Navassa: Legal Nightmares in a Biological Heaven?, IBRU BOUNDARY & SECURITY BULL.,
Autumn 2001, at 115, 125 (suggesting Haiti's claim has equivalent merit to U.S. claims over
Navassa).
62. Letter of Transmittal from President William J. Clinton, to the U.S. Senate, at HI
(July 27, 2000) reprinted in Western Gap Agreement, supra note 52.
63. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000).
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exploited, by a State or its nationals. The Truman Proclamation of 1945
placed the world on notice that the United States was projecting its au-
thority over continental shelf areas based on geologic, practical and
Lockean principles. The geologic principle was that such areas were "ex-
tension[s] of the land mass of the coastal nation and naturally
appurtenant to it."6 The practical tenet existed in the fact that the re-
sources therein/under included "seaward extension[s] of a pool or
deposit lying within the territory."65 And the Lockean rationale could be
seen in the portion of the claim highlighting the need for recognized ju-
risdiction to accommodate "prudent utilization" of such resources.'
The above-mentioned examples highlight the fact that "prudent utili-
zation" of marine resources will depend upon management efforts that
can transcend notions of territory and boundary.
Truman Proclamation, supra note 16, at 12,303.
Id.
Id.
